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Abstract: The Ed O’Bannon case (O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2015) 
has brought student-athlete compensation to the national spotlight. While the NCAA continues to 
defend its policy of amateurism, the time for college athlete compensation may soon become a 
reality (NCAA Division I Manual, 2019). Recent college athlete compensation models have 
explored revenue sharing models similar to that of professional sports leagues, although previous 
research failed to develop a compensation model for athletes in sports beyond basketball and 
football (Huma & Staurowsky, 2013). The current research argues for a more applied, market-
economy compensation model to offer fair compensation to collegiate athletes. This model takes 
into account the revenues generated by each university team, while also accounting for both the 
student-athlete and team’s performances on and off the field. Justifications for this model are 
explored, as this model will allow for a new way to compensate athletes via on and off-field 
metrics. This paper concludes with an example of the model’s utility through using publically 
accessible data for a major Division I college program.  
 
Keywords: NCAA, student-athlete compensation, market economy, athletics, student-
athlete 
 
At the National Collegiate Athletics Association’s (NCAA) annual convention in January, 
2012, Association President Mark Emmert addressed what he called the “collegiate model” 
(NCAA Division I Manual, 2019, p. 6; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013, p. 403) of college athletics 
and called for its reform so as to preclude the adoption of a “professional model” (Southall & 
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Staurowsky, 2013, p. 403). In his address, Emmert noted that while the collegiate model was in 
some respects outdated, he went on to say that this model was a better alternative than using a 
professional model in American college sport. Emmert’s address in 2012 included a statement that 
noted the NCAA was at a fork in the road regarding the vast revenues involved in college sport 
(Southall & Staurowsky, 2013).  
 
The NCAA’s concerns over the preservation of a model akin to amateurism in commercial 
college athletics, while hosting sports that generate revenue, are well founded. Despite being 
labeled as an amateur enterprise by the NCAA, certain college sports appear very similar in their 
operations to their professional counterparts. For example, much like professional football players, 
college football players compete at a high level and generate billions of dollars in revenue, as seen 
through the $2.25 billion deal between ESPN and the Southeastern Conference (SEC) over a 15 
year period (Smith & Ourand, 2008). One of the main differences between college and professional 
sports is that those at the professional level are allowed to negotiate their pay through individual 
contracts and collective bargaining. College football players work under an artificial salary cap 
that limits compensation to what is allowed within a college scholarship (Moyer, 2015). 
 
Since its inception, the popularity of college athletics has grown both steadily and 
exponentially (Santesteban & Leffler, 2017). This growth has led to the continued evolution of 
athletics programs, in terms of departmental size, complexity, and ambition. The NCAA was 
forced to regulate and accommodate such differences in its defense of amateurism. This stance on 
amateurism has allowed for various lawsuits to threaten the current state of the NCAA, including 
the Ed O’Bannon case.  
 
Previous research has questioned the NCAA’s model for student-athlete compensation in 
terms of the quality of education athletes receive (Berry III, 2013), adequate compensation for 
athletes (Huma & Staurowsky, 2013; Schott, 1996), and the removal of power from the student-
athlete (Nestle, 1992). The current research aims to add to the various options that college athletics 
can utilize in compensating student-athletes. Rather than focus this paper’s efforts on a discussion 
of anti-trust legislation and its relationship to the NCAA, the proposed model serves as an applied 
option for college athletics moving forward. In short, the proposed model will take two major 
factors into account: (a) a number of metrics to determine an individual student-athlete’s payout 
total, and (b) a 14% loading factor applied to that payout total. It should be noted that this model 
could be negotiated through a collective bargaining agreement and implemented on the university 
level through these negotiations. Furthermore, the crux of this model’s development was inspired 
by the O’Bannon case. The O’Bannon case brought student-athlete compensation to the forefront 
of educational news, while its effects drew concern at the highest levels of the NCAA. Aspects 
from various legal cases will be observed, although these cases’ purpose for this research was in 




In the paradigm of American college sport, it is taken for granted that collegiate sports be 
considered amateur in nature, as some sports have generated revenues for the NCAA totaling 
billions of dollars (Santesteban & Leffler, 2017; Steele, 2015). As such, this literature review 
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begins with an overview of amateurism and the NCAA, followed by relevant legal literature 
pertaining to the proposed formula.  
 
 Amateurism in college sports was derived from 19th century England, where it was used as 
a common mechanism to create economic and social stratification in sport. Wealthy elites were 
able to use strict amateur standards to exclude working people from the competitions, as the 
wealthy would compete, in their view, for love of the game rather than for monetary compensation 
(Dennie, 2012). These standards would eventually be the basis for intercollegiate athletics in the 
United States, which included a strict code of amateurism. This level of strictness was shown 
through Harvard’s ban on gate receipts at athletic contests during the late 1800’s. Eventually, the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS), the former name of the NCAA, 
was organized in 1906 to adopt and enforce strict amateurism standards (Dennie, 2012). 
 
According to NCAA Division I Manual (2019) Bylaw 2.9, “student-athletes shall be 
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by 
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived” (p. 10). Amateurism is 
further defined in Bylaw 2.13 as prohibiting “financial assistance” to student-athletes from all 
parties other than legal guardians or the institution for which the student-athlete participates in 
athletics. The institution is then further limited to providing financial assistance not to exceed the 
“cost of education authorized by the association also known as the ‘cost of attendance’” (NCAA 
Division I Manual, 2019, p. 11). The NCAA goes on to describe amateurism as an “avocation,” or 
hobby, where “student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises” (NCAA Division I Manual, 2019, p. 10).  
 
In clarifying what the word amateurism means as applied to college athletics, the late 
NCAA President Myles Brand stated that while amateurism describes how one would participate, 
it does not describe the enterprise. He followed that statement with a call to “not be ambivalent 
about doing the business of college sports” (Otto & Otto, 2013, p. 260). Brand was attempting to 
uncouple the athlete from the sport so that defining one would not mean defining the other. This 
would allow the NCAA to reap the benefits of being a commercial enterprise without having to 
pay the costs of the labor (Otto & Otto, 2013). 
 
Brand’s definition of amateurism may be perceived as faulty and out-of-date given the 
current state of sports revenues generated by the NCAA and its member institutions. The NCAA 
recently surpassed revenues of $1 billion annually (Kirshner, 2018). In 2013, immense popularity 
of Division I college football generated a total of $3.4 billion in total revenue by member 
institutions, and in 2014, the Top-50 NCAA football programs alone generated $5.2 billion in total 
revenue (Santesteban & Leffler, 2017; Steele, 2015). Over the past ten years, NCAA football 
revenue has risen more than 200 percent; by comparison, the National Hockey League (NHL), as 
one of the big-four professional sport leagues, reported a total of $3.7 billion in revenues in 2013 
(Steele, 2015). The economic realities of 21st century commercial college athletics, particularly 
football and men’s basketball, no longer justify strict restriction of student-athlete compensation. 
In fact, some have suggested that the NCAA failing to compensate student-athletes stems from 
neoliberal and racist ideologies deeply rooted in NCAA host institutions (Gales, Comeaux, 
Ofoegbu, & Grummert, 2018). These researchers suggested that the NCAA is the commercial 
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enterprise solely reaping the benefits of student-athlete exploitation. These realities were put on 
public display through the Ed O’Bannon case. 
 
O’Bannon vs. NCAA (2014) has changed the landscape of college athletics. Ed O’Bannon 
starred on the UCLA team that won the NCAA National Basketball Championship in 1995. 
Following his immense college success, O’Bannon continued his career in the National Basketball 
Association (NBA). In 2009, he filed suit against the NCAA and Electronic Arts (EA) Sports for 
the continued use of his name and likeness without providing him any compensation for that use, 
even more than a decade after he was no longer a collegiate athlete. Two years later, O’Bannon 
was joined in the lawsuit by former college and professional basketball player Oscar Robertson. 
The plaintiffs argued that in order for them to be eligible for participation in college sports, they 
were forced to sign a Student-Athlete Statement. By signing this statement, they authorized the 
NCAA and its licensees the use of their names and likenesses in perpetuity without having to share 
one penny of the profit with those athletes (O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
2014). O’Bannon argued that forcing athletes to sign away their rights to any income from the use 
of their image, especially without the help of legal counsel, was exploitation and that the policy 
created an undue restraint of trade. In addition, O’Bannon contended that not allowing former 
student-athletes to share in the profits generated by the use of their names and likenesses long after 
their college careers end served no legitimate purpose, which violated antitrust legislation 
(O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2014).   
 
Despite the NCAA’s success in eliminating a least restrictive compensation model for 
athletes derived from the O’Bannon case at the district level (O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, 2014), the concept was introduced to commercial collegiate athletics. The 
NCAA argued against O’Bannon by suggesting their amateur system was the only way to 
effectively continue to integrate academics and athletics while maintaining the competitive balance 
of its athletic contests (O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2014). Judge Wilken 
rejected the argument that totally restricting athlete compensation was necessary to maintain a 
competitive balance. In fact, allowing a more reasonable system of compensation may balance, 
and possibly increase, the level of competition and demand (Arash, 2014; Greene, 2012). Judge 
Wilken did, however, agree with the NCAA that large lump-sum payments to athletes during 
participation may have a negative impact on the competitive balance and lead to more athlete 
exploitation, especially if third parties were freely capitalizing on athlete talents, likenesses, and 
celebrity. If compensation beyond athletic expenses could be held in a trust by member schools 
until participation was completed, both the needs of the NCAA and athletes would be more justly 
fulfilled (Moyer, 2015). Additionally, other researchers suggested that athletic competitive balance 
would not be affected by the introduction of player compensation; rather it may more effectively 
counteract existing competitive advantages in recruiting held by major universities (Mills & 
Winfree, 2018).  
 
It should be noted that the NCAA appealed the district court’s decision in O’Bannon v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2015. The NCAA argued that O’Bannon did not 
successfully meet the standard for a Sherman Act claim, and that the plaintiffs failed to reach the 
merits of the case itself. On appeal, the courts found that given the current and proposed funding 
systems, to allow NCAA members to pay cash outright to student-athletes instead of granting 
scholarships would be a quantum leap. The appellate court then vacated the district court’s 
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decision, thus allowing the NCAA to retain its standard of amateurism. O’Bannon filed a Writ of 
Certiorari that the Supreme Court would deny. However, two other cases have challenged the 
NCAA’s existing compensation model. 
 
In Alston v. NCAA, the plaintiffs argued that allowing the NCAA to cap the value of athletic 
scholarships runs afoul of the law, as it does not allow conferences and universities to compete 
with each other (McCann, 2018b). The NCAA relied, in part, on the appellate court’s O’Bannon 
decision, stating that allowing Alston to succeed would make the NCAA a minor league for 
professional sports. In Jenkins v. NCAA, the plaintiffs argued that the NCAA’s practice of capping 
the value of athletic scholarships is anti-competitive, and asked Judge Wilken, who also presided 
over O’Bannon and Alston, to issue an injunction changing the way the NCAA operates moving 
forward (McCann, 2018a). Both of these cases may end up doing what O’Bannon did not: change 
the NCAA’s compensation model for student athletes. No matter the case outcome, appeals are 
likely, as this process may go on for some time.  
 
The compensation of college athletes seems to be an ongoing issue, although compensation 
of college athletes and providing fair compensation are two distinct issues. If colleges and 
universities existed in a free market for obtaining their player labor, each would compete for those 
athletes, but the competition would be based on the pay and benefits being offered. But, because 
the compensation for player labor is restricted to the cost of attendance, such competition is not 
necessary. In essence, the NCAA and its member institutions collude to fix wages (Sanderson & 
Siegfried, 2015). Were this not the case, finding an equitable and legal system of compensation 
would be difficult, further escalating the college sport “arms race for talent” (Santesteban & 
Leffler, 2017, p. 109).  
 
For example, based upon conventional methodology, in NCAA Division I (D-I) men’s 
basketball, about 60% of the players on a team generate revenue above and beyond the value of 
their athletic scholarship. Using that figure, approximately 40 to 50 of the 85 scholarship athletes 
on a D-I football team would generate revenue beyond the value of their scholarship (Sanderson 
& Siegfried, 2015). The relatively large discrepancies in wage potential between those players who 
derive revenue for their school, and those who do not, provide reason for pause; however, 
competitive markets are based upon compensation that provides more for those who create larger 
marginal products (Sanderson & Siegfried, 2015). 
 
Huma and Staurowsky (2013) examined student-athlete compensation via a report from 
the National College Players Association. They utilized a model of compensation based on the 
common revenue sharing system experienced in professional sports. In their model, football and 
men’s basketball players were the only athletes to receive compensation, with football players 
receiving about $150,000 and men’s basketball players receiving close to $230,000 annually. Their 
claim and rationale was based on a free market system. Zimbalist (2010) proposed that player 
revenue shares across the big four professional sport leagues (NFL, MLB [Major League 
Baseball], NBA, and NHL) vary from year to year, based more on what each team actually spends 
as opposed to deals reached through collective bargaining. The NFL’s range of player 
compensation as a percentage of total revenue ranged from 54.3% in 2005 to 62.1% in 1994, while 
the salary share of basketball related income in the NBA ranged from 53% in 1995-1996 to 65% 
in 2000-2001. Moreno and Lozano (2015) found that team efficiency has started to become the 
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new norm for athlete compensation in the NBA as the more successful teams use their funds 
efficiently to get the most production for their investments. These findings suggest that NBA 
franchises are going more towards a sabermetrics approach for developing their team rosters. 
Sabermetrics have evolved from a simple statistical analysis for top-tier player talent (Costa, 1991) 
to a tool used to predict baseball success based on in-game productivity (Anthony, 2009). This 
tool can be used as a means of individual performance, which has been used widely in the MLB 
with application attempts on the rise in the NFL.  
 
One approach to providing compensation to college athletes, while preserving some 
semblance of amateurism, is to adopt a mechanism utilizing trust funds, similar to the Olympic 
Model. The NCAA has staunchly defended the position that college athletes are students first, and 
success of the entire enterprise hinges upon athletes remaining unpaid “amateurs.” Even the term 
“student-athlete” was devised to subjugate athletes into a state of permanent amateurism (NCAA 
Division I Manual, 2019; Staurowsky & Sack, 2005). The only organization to rival the NCAA’s 
defense of amateurism on such a large scale was the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The 
IOC, like the NCAA, had one hard and fast rule: the Olympic Games were for amateurs only, and 
athletes who received compensation were exploiting the very essence of games for personal 
benefit. The IOC held that commercialization of the Olympics would only further destroy this 
essence (Greene, 2012). In 1972, the new leadership of the IOC explored both the commercial 
interests of the games and athlete compensation. When the greatest and most famous athletes 
competed, it attracted viewers. The increased viewership of the games enticed advertisers, which 
led to more lucrative television contracts. In the 1980’s, athletes commonly received subsidies or 
compensation for athletic expenses incurred in the pursuit of Olympic participation (Arash, 2014). 
Athletes were soon compensated for more than expenses and could use their prestige and visibility 
to maximize their utility in the free market.  
 
Unlike the IOC, the NCAA has yet to allow athletes the right to benefit from a market 
economy (NCAA Division I Manual, 2019). In O’Bannon v. NCAA, Judge Wilken offered a 
substantial remedy that successfully satisfied, for a short time, the interests of both the NCAA and 
the athletes (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). Wilken’s remedy involved allowing the: 
  
NCAA’s no-pay rules [to] remain in force but the organization may also adopt a  
definition of compensation and benefits that is “related to education” for the purposes of 
complying with the judge’s order…allowing each conference and its member schools to 
provide additional education-related benefits without NCAA caps and prohibitions, as well 
as academic awards… (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014) 
 
The success of the Olympic Model and this judicial remedy served as inspiration for the proposed 
model of student-athlete compensation.    
 
The purpose of this research was to provide the first competitive model of athlete 
compensation, which provides consideration to student-athletes based on a market economy. This 
model has the potential to adequately and practically provide student-athletes with an equitable 
share of the revenue they help produce for their athletic departments. In this manner, student-
athletes in sports such as track and field, golf, soccer, etc., will have the opportunity to make 
financial gains. This model takes into account a multitude of factors, including team performance, 
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the percentage of revenue produced by each individual athletic team, and individual performance. 
Before its introduction, some of the direct and closely-related literature will be examined to inform 
the model. The model specifics will then be presented along its direct application via a case study 
methodology. Finally, a brief discussion of the implications and future directions for this model, 




New Revenue Distribution Model 
 
Institutes of higher learning have a choice – they may choose to allow a purely free market 
economy approach that dictates the student-athlete market, or they may choose to use some of the 
models previously overviewed. A pure free market approach, however, may require a collective 
bargaining agreement between the NCAA and its institutions, as well as the student-athletes. The 
turnover for student-athletes is apparent and could lead to a new collective bargaining agreement 
to be negotiated every four years to allow for the current student-athletes to contribute to the 
negotiations. Continually adopting a new collective bargaining agreement may not be in the best 
interest of the NCAA or the student-athletes, as professional leagues have seen a loss of revenues 
from negotiating new agreements. 
 
The revenue sharing model presented in this paper mandates that individual teams within 
a university’s athletic department that generate over 33% of the revenue will redistribute this 
revenue to other teams within the same athletic department. This model will apply at the university 
level as opposed to the NCAA level. The proposed model introduces a formula to derive the value 
that the student-athlete provides to a team. The student-athlete portion of this formula essentially 
suggests what percentage of revenue each athlete contributes to their team on and off the field. 
This model is an attempt to derive the value created by the athlete to the athletic department to 
ensure a fairer compensation model. This model was not based solely on a pure market economy 
type model, as this model sought to compensate all college athletes, not just those in the most 
prominent college sports.  
 
Huma and Staurowsky (2013) also provided a model for compensating basketball and 
football players with the notion that they are the significant revenue producers for their athletic 
department. After reviewing individual team revenues, each team did produce some revenue for 
their athletic department. While each team was not able to fully support itself, the student-athletes 
were still representing their athletic department in an activity that produces revenue for the entirety 
of the department, which included their team.  
 
Under the proposed model, the cost of attendance factor implemented by the NCAA would 
be revoked and replaced with a comparable allowance from the individual student-athlete’s claim 
on overall revenues of the athletic department (NCAA Division I Manual, 2019). The cost of 
attendance figure can be viewed as a prohibitory force to athletes, recognizing their full earning 
potential from the athletic department. The proposed model introduces a means for the athlete to 
receive a fair share of the athletic departments’ revenues while also ensuring the student-athlete 
could achieve academic success and graduate. An athlete will have an immediate payout based on 
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a percentage total, derived from on and off field metrics, with the rest of their earned funds being 
held in a trust fund that will be released after the student graduates. 
 
Graduation from school is a foundational element of this model and is a dominant reason 
for excess earnings that are not received during the fiscal year to be kept in a trust fund, contingent 
upon graduation. A student-athlete should have to uphold their end of the agreement with the 
athletic department and university to strive for academic success. “Financial assistance,” otherwise 
known as and used interchangeably as “financial aid,” “grant-in-aid,” and “a scholarship,” are 
referred to as an amount of money that is given by an institution to pay for the student’s education 
(NCAA Division I Manual, 2019). Financial assistance is intended to be utilized for a student’s 
education and the student-athlete should uphold their end of the relationship in graduating from 
school.  
 
The percentage claim on revenues for a student-athlete will be comparable to the 
percentage that cost of attendance figures into the overall grant-in-aid for the student-athlete 
(NCAA Division I Manual, 2019). The formula for deriving the claim a student-athlete has on the 
generated revenues for the year equates to the average cost of attendance (e.g., tuition and fees, 
room and board) compiled by the U.S. Department of Education, and the average cost of 
attendance expense for schools in the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) category. 
According to the U.S. Department of Education, the average cost of attendance per year for a four 
year institution (private and public) was $23,872 (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). Solomon 
(2015) produced a database with the expense for schools in FBS schools, revealing that the average 
cost of attendance stipend came out to $3,814. 
 
Previous literature does not provide clear guidance on a specific metric to utilize in 
determining the proper methodology for deriving the equitable share of revenue for student-
athletes. This metric was surmised using the amount of the overall expense for grant-in-aid 
provided to the student-athlete. Since this model will take away cost-of-attendance for the student-
athlete, this void will be filled by providing the same percentage of overall revenue for student-
athletes. The breakdown for the proposed model is 14% ($23,872 + $3,814 = $27,686, then 
$3,814/$27,686 = 0.14). A further breakdown of the formula that will be utilized in determining 




Formula Development and Justification 
 
A pragmatic and inductive approach was used to compose the proposed model for athlete 
compensation. The model has been broken down piece by piece as a guide for usage by athletic 
personnel. This model assumes that athletes will start with zero compensation with the opportunity 
for gaining funds based off of on-field contributions, winning percentages, and other benchmarks 
described within. Again, this model should be seen as a potential tool for the NCAA and its 
member institutions as a fair way to compensate athletes. The model itself takes into consideration 
both the university and athlete’s needs by allowing a player’s talent to determine compensation 
while allowing the university to clearly delineate which players will receive compensation. While 
this model eliminates some bias, it does not eradicate it completely; other arguments for collective 
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bargaining and anti-trust laws can be seen through court cases or other academic works (Berri, 
2012; Hilly & Jolly, 2015; Moyer, 2015).  
 
As previously stated, 14% of the revenue generated by NCAA member institutions goes 
toward covering cost of attendance on average, or college expense (CE) per athlete. Simply put, 
14% of the revenue generated by the university on average would go towards funding a student-
athlete’s CE, including tuition, books, room and board, and miscellaneous costs. In recent history, 
prominent sports leagues such as the NFL have used up to 68.5% of their total revenue towards 
player compensation while the NBA players accounted for 57% of the income generated through 
the league and league activities (Berri, 2012; Vrooman, 2012). This model proposed an elimination 
of the cost of attendance stipend, instead paying athletes this 14% (roughly) outright. 
  
The variables introduced here were reverse engineered from two overarching factors: the 
player cap and the player compensation coefficient. These variables were chosen because the 
equation is based on the most money a player can receive as opposed to starting with a zero total 
for athlete compensation. From there, multiplying the highest total by the player compensation 
coefficient would lead to the final pay out to the student-athlete. Variables within the player cap 
total are discussed below, as the player compensation coefficient is discussed from a broader 
perspective. The equations are presented in a logical flow, from the beginning of the process to the 
end. 
 
First, 14% of the total revenue generated by each individual sport within a school will be 
allocated not toward scholarships and other CE expenses, but rather toward a separate account, or 
Student-Athlete Fund (SAF). Team revenue (TR) could be generated via ticket sales, sponsors, and 
television revenue. The following equation represents this fund generation, with different sports 
represented by S: 
 
SAF = Σ((0.14(TRS1)) + (0.14(TRS2)) + (0.14(TRS3))…) 
 
The SAF will then be dispersed to each team within a school in a manner similar to revenue 
sharing practices in MLB. The MLB commissioned the Blue Ribbon Panel to find a solution 
toward their top-heavy success (Hill & Jolly, 2015). Clubs were taxed into the revenue sharing 
model of the MLB, which taxed every team but favored taxing teams with higher overall team 
salaries. A cap limit was set on taxing high spenders to keep the league competitive for free agency 
issues.  
 
This model proposes that teams would receive a percentage (Percentage of Total Revenue 
[PTR]) of the SAF based on the total revenue they acquire. This number was extrapolated from the 
revenue (TR) brought in by a sport (plus an equal percentage of revenue not related to specific 
teams [RNRST], symbolized by SRV) divided by grand total revenue (GTR). This percentage of a 
team’s claim on the SAF will be capped at 33%.  
 
PTR1 = SRV1/GTR; PTR2 = SRV2/GTR… 
SRV1 = TR1+RNRST 
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Non-adjusted totals (NAT) would then be generated by multiplying a team’s PTR by the overall 
SAF. The NAT score represents a baseline for each team’s eventual student-athlete fund for that 
particular team. 
NAT1 = PTR1*SAF; NAT2 = PTR2*SAF 
 
For teams over the 33% athletes mark, the difference between the NAT and the adjusted 
total (AT) would then be distributed between the number of teams below the 33% threshold (LT). 
AT will recalculate the team’s total at the 33% mark. For all other teams, the new additive is 
symbolized by GA. 
GA = NAT1 - AT1 
AT1 = (PTR33%) *(SAF) 
 
The GA total would be added to all teams below the 33% threshold for the new added totals 
(ADT). The total amount of funds redistributed to teams will be based on the number of athletes 
(TA) per team. First, find the total number of athletes on teams with a PTR below 33% (BTA). 
Divide the GA by the BTA total, and multiply the result (MPA) by the number of athletes on a 
team. Add this total (ADM) to each team. 
 
BTA = Σ(TA33%>PTR) + (TA33%>PTR) … 
MPA = GA/BTA 
ADM1 = (TA33%>PTR1) *(MPA) 
ADT1 = ADM1 + NAT1; ADT2 = ADM2 + NAT2… 
 
It should be noted that the teams above 33% will not receive this adjustment, and 
administrators should use the formula PTRAbove33%Teams= ADTsetat 33%. After determining the ADT 
figures, individual player compensation must then be addressed. Camara (2009) proposed that a 
company must exceed a certain threshold of earnings before they pay a bonus to their 
managers/employees. In other words, managers and employees must meet a certain threshold 
performance. This model acknowledges that not all student-athletes will meet these thresholds. 
Thus, this model will be based off of the maximum amount a person can obtain from the ADT and 
number of participants per team. This player cap (PCA) is the maximum amount an athlete can 
receive. The sum of a team’s athletes is shown by the symbol TA. PCA totals apply to a whole 
team (i.e., football, women’s basketball, etc.). 
 
PCA1 = ADT1/(TA1); PCA2 = ADT2/(TA2) … 
 
These funds are only for those who participated in the current season of their respective NCAA 
sport, with compensation being applied at the end of the season in two ways: 14% will go to the 
athletes as compensation, while 86% will remain in a trust fund that will be rewarded after 
successful completion of a bachelor’s (or graduate) degree.  
 
Three factors will determine an individual’s payment from each sports team: Sport 
Visibility (SV, 33%), Team Success (TM, 34%), and Individual Statistics (IS, 33%). Each factor 
would need to be defined per sport, but in general, each factor would have some commonalities 
(shown in Figure 1). SV components would include ticket sales, number of sellouts, nationally 
televised games, social media presence, and a loading factor that compares the estimated reach of 
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that particular team versus teams within a similar sport. For example, a smaller Division I school 
may not have the same visibility in volleyball as larger Division I schools in more established 
programs. Next, TM would be determined by a number of factors, such as having a winning record, 
conference tournament appearances, conference championship appearances, NCAA Tournament 
Appearances, and NCAA Tournament Championships. Last, IS would account for various 
individual player statistics, which would amount to different measurements by sport, but would 
include a team leader in certain statistics depending on the sport (i.e., strikeouts per season, 
receiving touchdowns, etc.), individual starts for the team, appearances for team (in-game), 
conference leader in a certain statistic, and NCAA statistical leader for a game, a season, and/or a 
career in a certain statistic.    
 
Adding these factors together will equate to the Player Compensation Coefficient. Camara 
(2009) posited that a non-sports entity would not pay a bonus to their managers/employees until a 
certain threshold of earnings was exceeded. Stated differently, a certain threshold performance 
must then be met by their managers/employees to receive a bonus. This model assumes that not 
all student-athletes will meet these thresholds. These funds are only for those who participate in 
the current season of their respective NCAA sport, with compensation applied at the end of the 
season in a trust fund at 86%, while actually receiving 14%. Immediately following this part of the 
equation, the final equation would be used to determine what a player will receive for a season. 




Figure 1. Player Compensation Coefficient (PCE) 
 
Sport Visibility (SV) Can add up to 33% or 
0.33 
Accounted for via ticket sellouts for 
games (TS), number of nationally 






Team Success (TM) Can add up to 34% or 
0.34 
Accounted for via winning record 
(WR), conference tournament 
appearances (CT), conference 
championship appearances (CC), 
NCAA Tournament Appearances 











Can add up to 33% or 
0.33 
Team Leader in a positive category 
(TL), Individual starts for a team 
over the course of a season versus 
number of team games played (ST), 
Individual appearances for a team 
over the course of a season versus 
number of team games played (AP), 
Conference Leader in a positive 
category (CL), NCAA individual 
stat leader for a game (NCAAIS), 
NCAA individual stat leader for a 
season (NCAASS), NCAA 




Should this coefficient equal 1, then that athlete would receive the maximum funds 
available at the player cap. The final result will be multiplied by each year’s player cap (PCA) to 
discover how much the NCAA will pay these athletes for their efforts. PCE indicators will need 
to be determined by sport by either the individual institutions or the NCAA. Finally, the athlete 
compensation (total) is represented by AC. 
 
AC1 = (PCE1) *(PCA1); AC2 = (PCE2)*(PCA1); AC3 = (PCE3)*(PCA2)… 
 
To show what this equation would look like in practice, the authors obtained a revenue 
statement for the University of Colorado. The University of Colorado was chosen as it was found 
that, after a review of athletic department revenues as reported through the United States 
Department of Education Equity in Athletics database, the University of Colorado’s departmental 
revenues were close to the mean of NCAA FBS athletic departments. Furthermore, the University 
of Colorado was a member of a Power Five conference in 2015. Thus, the University of Colorado 
was deemed an adequate site to test this model.  
 
The University of Colorado posted their NCAA financial report in 2015, containing a 
breakdown of revenues and expenses for each of their sports. Furthermore, the revenues and team 
numbers reported there were used through each step of this model. There were some surprises, 
such as the potential financial gains for men’s and women’s golf, that are explained in the 
discussion section. 
  





Application to the University of Colorado (2015) 
 
Sport PTR NAT Adjust over 
33% 
Difference Add Adjustment TA Player Cap 
M BBALL 12.48% $1,145,488.55 NO   103,125.72 1,248,614.27 17 $73,447.90 
W BBALL 3.96% $363,225.53 NO   103,125.72 466,351.25 13 $35,873.17 
M X CNTRY, 
T&F  
3.50% $321,169.53 NO   103,125.72 424,295.25 236 $1,797.86 
W X CNTRY, 
T&F  
3.58% $328,534.79 NO   103,125.72 431,660.51 216 $1,998.43 
FOOTBALL  46.49% $4,265,857.97 $3,028,349.39 $1,237,508.59   3,028,349.39 112 $27,038.83 
M GOLF  3.52% $323,388.11 NO   103,125.72 426,513.83 6 $71,085.64 
W GOLF 3.59% $329,706.31 NO   103,125.72 432,832.03 8 $54,104.00 
W LAX 3.85% $353,288.61 NO   103,125.72 456,414.33 31 $14,723.04 
M SKI 3.44% $315,306.89 NO   103,125.72 418,432.61 11 $38,039.33 
W SKI 3.58% $328,711.33 NO   103,125.72 431,837.05 13 $33,218.23 
W SOCCER 4.44% $407,257.21 NO   103,125.72 510,382.93 30 $17,012.76 
W TENNIS 3.54% $324,868.89 NO   103,125.72 427,994.61 8 $53,499.33 
VOLLEYBALL 4.03% $370,012.59 NO   103,125.72 473,138.31 17 $27,831.67 
 
Student-Athlete Consideration 
As discussed in the previous section, 14% of each student-athlete’s revenue allotment will 
be immediately available filling the void left from the removal of the cost-of-attendance stipend. 
The remaining 86% will be placed in a trust fund that the Federal Court has already deemed as an 
acceptable method of compensation for the student-athlete to recover once they graduate from 
school (Moyer, 2015). If a student-athlete leaves early from school for professional sports, they 
have five years to complete their degree or the funds that they collected in the trust fund are given 
back to the athletic department’s scholarship fund. 
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Figure 2. The Student-Athlete Compensation Model 
 
Determine Overall Student-Athlete 
Fund 
SAF=Σ((0.14(TRS1))+(0.14(TRS2))+(0.14(TRS3))…) 
Determine How Much Each Team Will 
Receive From SAF (Percentage) 
PTR1= SRV1/GTR; PTR2= SRV2/GTR…; 
SRV1=TR1+RNRST 
Determine Each Team’s Baseline 
Student Distribution Funds 
 
NAT1=PTR1*SAF; NAT2=PTR2*SAF 
Determine Adjustment Totals Overall GA=NAT1-AT1;  
AT1=(PTR33%)*(SAF) 
 
Determine Adjustment Totals Per Team 
(Based On Number of Athletes) 




Determine Maximum Amount A Player 
Can Receive (Maximum) 
 
PCA1= ADT1/(TA1); PCA2= ADT2/(TA2)… 
Standards For Athlete Payout (Player 
Compensation Coefficient) 
 
See Figure 1 
Determine Athlete Payout 
 
 
AC1=(PCE1) *(PCA1); AC2=(PCE2)*(PCA1); 
AC3=(PCE3)*(PCA2)… 




Determine Athlete Payout to Trust Fund (AC1)*0.86 
 
Discussion 
Although the Ed O’Bannon case was not heard by the Supreme Court, this case brought 
the idea of athlete compensation to the public arena. The proposed model aims to serve college 
athletics as a functional option, should the issue of student-athlete compensation need a realistic 
solution. This model takes absolutely nothing away from the NCAA, and in the spirit of 
sabermetrics (though not born from sabermetrics), this model demands efficiency for a player to 
receive maximum compensation. Sabermetrics may find a home in this model when determining 
what would constitute a full PCE value for student-athletes, but this needs to be explored further 
per sport. This model was created for a broad application, and to get scholars and practitioners 
alike to begin a dialogue on how to fairly compensate student-athletes. There is no magic answer 
to this issue, but the authors assert that this set of formulas should serve as a ground-level base for 
further development. 
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Many who are reading this article will take issue with some of the results from the case 
study presented. For example, a men’s golfer in this formula application has the opportunity to 
make over $71,000 based on the University of Colorado’s financial records. This can be explained 
by the ways in which administrators reported revenues. In a sport such as golf, donations such as 
golf clubs, rounds at a golf course, and sales through the golf course of university approved 
merchandise may be reported as part of the sport’s overall revenue. For this equation to work, the 
NCAA and individual institutions need to truthfully report their revenue based solely on monetary 
transactions and donations, not gifts in kind (i.e., rounds of golf at a golf course, donated 
equipment, etc.). Furthermore, these results are unique to the University of Colorado and not to 
every school in Division I.  
 
Sports such as track and field had results that may look subpar in terms of athlete 
compensation. Athletes in this group, however, are often represented through indoor and outdoor 
track and field, alongside cross country. In other words, these athletes have the potential to make 
up to three times the amount listed if they participate in all other sports. Other examples of this 
would include volleyball and beach volleyball, or multiple-sport athletes. Football, and potentially 
basketball, can act as a moderator to allow athletes to be compensated, a practice already in place 
across universities and colleges. 
 
This Student-Athlete Compensation Model answered the call of Schott (1996) when he 
asserted that “other alternatives to the free market system must be explored in an effort to provide 
compensation to student-athletes” (p. 43). There is a presence of a free-market economy in the 
Student-Athlete Compensation Model, as an athlete’s potential salary is determined in part by 
purchasing of tickets to athletic events. The Student-Athlete Compensation Model does not nestle 
within solely one economic background, but several, as the issue of compensating student-athletes 
is complex. The factors introduced within the Student-Athlete Compensation Model do need to be 
explored further as each specific sports metrics for athlete performance need to be addressed. The 
Student-Athlete Compensation Model presented here should act as the starting point, or as an 
alternate option, for solving the issue of funding student-athletes.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
 As with all forms of research, this model came with its own limitations. First, this paper 
sought to explore a new way to potentially compensate student-athletes through various equations. 
This model is in no way intended to be the only athlete compensation model available, as other 
models should be proposed and explored. Legal aspects of the model were not included, but it is 
recognized that this model would need to go through proper legal footholds before it could be 
implemented. Future research on the legality of the model in terms of antitrust legislation would 
be necessary moving forward. Next, the Student-Athlete Compensation Model looked only at one 
school in the NCAA. Future scholars can use this model, or others, to examine its potential effects 
on the entirety of the NCAA’s Division I schools. This model was developed with a student-
athlete-first mindset, as opposed to the revenues and expenses of the NCAA, the NCAA’s 
conferences, and individual athletic departments. This model was proposed with the intent of 
adding a new dimension to player compensation conversations, and should be used as a building 
block for future developments. This case study was at the mercy of figures reported to the NCAA, 
which did not differentiate gifts in-kind from revenue generation. For this equation to properly 
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work, true revenue numbers should be reported to the NCAA separately from revenues generated. 
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